This short Letter elucidates a fundamental relationship between self-replication of living systems and the halting problem in computation theory.
John von Neumann's theory of self-reproducing automata [5, 6] is now regarded as one of the greatest theoretical achievements made in early stages of artificial life research [1, 3, 2] . Before working on its implementation on cellular automata, von Neumann sketched an outline of his self-replicating machine that consists of the following parts [5] :
A: A universal constructor that constructs a product X from an instruction tape I(X) that describes how to construct X.
B: A tape copier that duplicates I(X).
C: A controller that dominates A and B and does the following:
1. Give I(X) to A and let it construct X.
2. Pass I(X) to B and let it duplicate I(X).
3. Attach one copy of I(X) to X and separate X + I(X) from the rest.
The functions of these parts are symbolically written as
Then self-replication can be achieved if one lets X = D ≡ A + B + C, i.e.,
Alan Turing's preceding work on computationally universal machines [4] gave a hint for von Neumann to develop these formulations of self-replicating machines, especially on the idea of universal constructor A. These two kinds of machines share the same concept that a universal system, given an appropriate finite description, can execute any arbitrary tasks specified in the description. The only difference is that one is about computation in an infinite tape, and the other is about construction in an infinite space. The former pioneered computation theory. The latter also pioneered a new, yet unnamed to date, field of study connecting logic and mathematics to biology and engineering. Here let us name this field construction theory for now.
While von Neumann's universal constructor holds a close correspondence to Turing's universal computer, however, little attention has been paid to what the entire self-replicating automaton D in construction theory would parallel in computation theory. Besides A, the automaton D also includes B that duplicates a given tape and C that attaches a copy of the duplicated tapes to the product of A. They are the subsystems that von Neumann added to the automaton in view of self-replication. Their counterparts are not present in the design of Turing machines, and therefore, the entire architecture of self-replicating machines has often been underestimated as if it were a heuristic design meaningful only on the construction side, but not on the computation side.
Here I show that self-replication in construction theory actually has a fundamental relationship with the halting problem in computation theory.
The halting problem is a well-known decision problem that can be informally described as follows:
Given a description of a computer program and an initial input it receives, determine whether the program eventually finishes computation and halts on that input.
This problem has been one of the most profound issues in computation theory since 1936 when Alan Turing proved that no general algorithm exists to solve this problem for any arbitrary programs and inputs [4] . The conclusion is often paraphrased that the halting problem is undecidable.
Turing's proof uses reductio ad absurdum. A well-known simplified version takes the following steps. First, assume that there is a general algorithm that can solve the halting problem for any program p and input i. This means that there must be a Turing machine H that always halts for any p and i and computes the function h(p, i) ≡ 1 if the program p halts on the input i, 0 otherwise.
Second, one can easily derive from this machine another Turing machine H ′ whose behavior is modified to compute only diagonal components in the p-i space, i.e., h
This machine determines whether the program p halts when its self-description is given to it as an input. Such a self-reference would be meaningless for most of actual computer programs, but still theoretically possible.
Then, finally, one can tweak H ′ slightly to make yet another machine H * that falls into an infinite loop if h ′ (p) = 1. What could happen if H * was supplied with its self-description p(H * )? It eventually halts if h ′ (p(H * )) = h(p(H * ), p(H * )) = 0, i.e., if it does not halt on p(H * ). Or, it loops forever if h ′ (p(H * )) = h(p(H * ), p(H * )) = 1, i.e., if it eventually halts on p(H * ). Both lead to contradiction. Therefore, the assumption we initially made must be wrong-there must be no general algorithm to solve the halting problem.
Here, I would like to bring up an informative, yet relatively untold, fact that Turing himself did not take the third step in his original proof. Instead, he essentially considered the actual behavior of H ′ on its self-description
, and hence it needs to compute the behavior of the machine described in p(H ′ ) on the input p(H ′ ). Turing noticed that what this machine is computing is exactly the same situation as the machine itself is in: "H ′ is looking at p(H ′ )." This results in a cyclic process, making it impossible for H ′ to halt in a finite time.
What ever is happening to H ′ in the process above? It tries to simulate the behavior of H ′ + p(H ′ ), which tries to simulate the behavior of H ′ + p(H ′ ), which tries to simulate the behavior of H ′ + p(H ′ ), ... Interestingly, this chain of self-simulation takes place in the form identical to that of self-replication in von Neumann's construction theory, if "to simulate the behavior" is read as "to construct the structure". This can be clearly realized by noting that the role of C that attaches I(X) to X shown in (3) parallels the role of diagonalization shown in (6); both attempt to apply a copy of the description to the system represented by the description. In this sense, von Neumann's design of self-replicating machines is by no means an anomaly in construction theory-rather, it correctly reflects the self-simulation chain of computational machines that appears in the proof presented by Turing.
The insight obtained above provides us with many implications about the connections between computation theory and construction theory. The simulating H ′ is to the simulated H ′ as the parent constructor is to the offspring constructor. To solve the halting problem is to find whether a construction process ever stops in the future. More broadly, to simulate what a Turing machine eventually computes is to find out what a universal constructor eventually produces. The undecidability of the halting problem implies that a similar undecidability also applies to these construction problems.
In the context discussed above, the endless chain of self-replication that living systems are in, can be understood as a parallel to the endless chain of self-simulation that a halting-problem solver falls in. In a sense, we are all in the process initiated billions of years ago by a first universal constructor, who just tried to see the final product of its "diagonal" construction.
